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The Impersonal Judgment: Its Nature, Origin, and Significance

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF ARTS, LITERATURE, AND SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

BY SIMON FRASER MacLENNAN

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THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND SIGNIFICANCE.

The consideration of such expressions as “*ἔει, χρῆ*, pluit, mich hungert, it grows, fire,” has excited much interest from the days of the Greeks. The name—impersonal or subjectless propositions—which has been given them will serve to explain this. Aristotle, the father and oracle of formal logic, asserted, upon the basis of an analysis of propositions, that every judgment must have a subject and a predicate. After his day attention was directed to the impersonal because it did not appear to conform to the rule of judgments. Thus arose a controversy which has come down to us.

This state of affairs suggests several thoughts: (A) When theories presuppose and destroy one another there is a necessity of looking for some presupposition underlying and determining the various points of view. (B) An historical review of the field of controversy is also called for. By means of it we shall obtain the various types of theory which have been held, together with their relations to one another and to the presupposition. (C) The way will then be left open for an intelligent and thorough criticism of former investigations and a method for a new investigation provided. These thoughts indicate the natural divisions into which our subject falls.

A. PRESENTATION OF THE PRESUPPOSITION UNDERLYING PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS.

The presupposition common to all views, with the exception of one or two, may be stated in a few words. Investigators have accepted without question the statement that impersonal expressions are judgments. And again they have admitted that the normal judgment must have a subject and a predicate. The result has been that the more systematic and logical minds have been forced to seek a subject which has eluded them at every turn. On the other hand, those who have had facts more in mind than theories have pointed out that the various subjects brought forward have been formal and empty, or have been gained through twisting the form and meaning of the proposition. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that controversy has brought the problem no nearer to solution.

But we shall be asked on what basis the above thorough-going assertion has been made. Proof of our assertion must, therefore, be brought forward. Several reasons may be given:

I. Following the historical development several conclusive proofs with reference to antiquity present themselves:

1. Aristotle gave to formal logic that systematic form which it has retained almost without change to the present day.¹ In the hands of the rhetoricians it was made the instrument of argumentation, and was regularly taught in the schools established in the towns and cities.² By the time of the Middle Ages, formal logic had become the universal method of investigation, and by its use the doctrines received on the authority of the church were elaborated and defended.³ Although beginnings of inductive research are noticeable early in Greek thought, it was not until the dawn of the modern era that they were set on an independent footing. Toward a formulation of inductive inquiry the two Bacons did much, but it remained for our own century and Stuart Mill to make, in England, a systematic presentation of the method. And even yet science is not fully conscious of its own inner method of procedure. These facts, which are now commonplaces in the philosophic world, make it evident that all ancient criticism proceeded (and necessarily so) upon the basis of formal logic. This thought becomes more forceful when we remember how the spirit of speculation in and of itself died out after Aristotle. Thought turned more and more to ethical and religious questions. Logic busied itself mainly with matters of detail, until in the skeptic movement it seemed to be devoid of all content whatever. In the succeeding period authority supplied the content, but formal logic gave the method for the manipulation of this content both in the religious and secular schools.

Now formal logic has always insisted that every judgment or proposition must have both a subject and a predicate. Aristotle first made this assertion upon the basis of an analysis of the Greek sentence. The assertion next took the form that predication necessarily involved something of which it was predicated, *i. e.*, a subject. Further, there was no doubt that impersonals (with the exception of such expressions as *χρῆ*, which proved too refractory to the methods of reduction then

¹ See Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*.

² Hatch, *Hibbert Lectures*, 1888, pp. 25 ff.

³ See histories of philosophy in general; also Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*.

known) were genuine judgments. Hence the search for a subject was a matter of pure consistency.

On the other hand, those who most strenuously opposed the logicians never brought the general doctrine of the judgment into question, but simply asserted that the logicians were perverting language in their attempts to find a subject.¹

2. The fact which directly proves our assertion is, that in both ancient and modern times (with few exceptions) the impersonal has been regarded as an anomaly.² It indeed seemed to be a freak of thought, and all endeavor was turned toward explaining its peculiar nature. This fact is so evident that no detailed proof is necessary. From the time of Quintilian until the present day the impersonal has remained something strange and uncouth. The long-sustained controversy stands as testimony to the fact that this form of expression is sufficiently individual to baffle the most earnest endeavors to bring it consistently under the general form of mental assertion.

Putting the two proofs together there can be no doubt that a presupposition, such as we have described, underlay all investigation of the impersonal judgment in ancient times.

II. When we come to modern times the nature of the presupposition becomes very evident. It is true that of recent years logic has begun to be reconstructed more upon a psychological basis, but much of ancient tradition still remains, and this shows itself particularly in regard to the judgment. Most logicians assert with confidence that all judgment must be twofold, must have a subject and a predicate, while the few who stand for a new interpretation are regarded as quite erroneous.² With regard to the treatment of impersonals the recognition of the presupposition determining investigation is quite complete. Erdmann says,³ "In all of them (impersonal judgments) a cause, be it ever so undetermined, is presented . . . since an event without a substratum, a quality without a subject, is altogether unrepresentable." Kaindl,⁴ although endeavoring to solve the problem on traditional lines, recognizes very clearly the basis on which most of the investigations have been made. His words are worth quoting: "The

¹ For details see below, pp. 8 ff.

³ Logik, p. 304.

² For details see below, pp. 8 ff.

⁴ Wesen und Bedeutung der Impersonalien, p. 278. Cf. Schuppe, *Zeitschr. für V., Psy. u. Sprachwiss.*, Bd. 16, pp. 244 ff.; Venn, *Empirical Logic*, p. 233; Steinthal, *Zeitschr. für V. Psy. u. Sprachwiss.*, Bd. 4, pp. 235-7.

question as to the essence and meaning of impersonals is old. The ground of interest lies near enough. While, according to grammar, each proposition must have a subject and a predicate, and, according to logic, of a subject, a predicate notion is affirmed or denied, in the expressions, 'Es donnert,' 'Es ist mir wohl,' 'Es ist Tag,' the subject seems to be lacking. Now, since from the grammatical standpoint it could not be denied that 'Es donnert,' etc., were propositions, from the logical point of view they had to be considered as judgments. Thus there arose a contradiction which gave rise to many attempts at explanation." Kaindl spoke truly when he remarked that contradiction seemed to be the only outcome of previous investigation. This makes it all the more evident that a criticism of the underlying pre-supposition is necessary to further investigation of the impersonal.

B. HISTORICAL RESUMÉ.

The various theories of the impersonal may be classed under two general heads: (I), doctrines which emphasize the place where the subject is to be sought; (II), doctrines which are characterized by the kind of subject which must be sought.

I. The first general division falls into several minor parts:

1. The subject is sought in the grammatical form. This view is peculiarly characteristic of ancient thought, and the reason is not far to seek. The clear-cut distinctions which moderns make between the subjective and the objective, between thought and expression, or, again, between judgment and proposition, are a late acquisition.¹ At first the mind recognizes no distinction between them and interprets both from the objective side. Thus Aristotle derived his doctrine of the judgment from the analysis of propositions. The logicians who followed him were rhetoricians as well as logicians, and for a great length of time logic and rhetoric were inseparable. Hence the early form of the controversy under consideration was concerned with the possibility of finding a subject in the structure of the proposition. Three types of this view appear: (a) the Greek, (b) the Latin, (c) the Italian.

(a) The Greek grammarians thought that a nominative should be supplied, and for this purpose "Zeus" seems to have been the favorite—Zeus rained, thundered, snowed. This points to a comparatively advanced stage in thought, a stage in which particular gods (and finally one god) were supposed to be the causes of natural changes in general,

¹ See Burnett, *Early Greek Philosophy*, Introduction.

and especially of those not referable to some known, finite cause. These verbs were denominated *θεῖα ῥήματα*,¹ on account of their reference to the deity as the cause of the events they indicated. A number of exceptions (*e. g.*, *Δεῖ, χροῖ*) were found to this rule. In these Zeus could not very well be taken as the subject. To obviate the difficulty such verbs were straightway interpreted as adverbs, and the Greek logical conscience seems to have been satisfied.

(*δ*) In the main the Roman investigators expounded and defended the position of the Greek grammarians; in all things literary the latter were always the inspiration of the former. About the only contribution made by the Romans was in seeking the subject in the infinitive. Quintilian,² who set Roman rhetoric upon a firm basis, remarked upon the difference between the personal and the impersonal forms. He perceived a difference between "*panditur interea domus omnipotentis Olympi*" and "*totis usque adeo turbatur agris*." In the latter a starting point, an "*initium*," is lacking. According to Priscian,³ he who wishes to understand the impersonal must seek a subject in the nominative of the activity implied in the verb. For example, when we say "*curritur*" we mean "*cursus curritur*," also "*eventus evenit*," etc. That is, Priscian accepts the position, but finds the subject otherwise than in Zeus.

The opponents of those who sought a subject in the grammatical structure of the proposition contented themselves with pointing out that a real subject was lacking, and that every attempt made to supply such a subject had vitiated the original meaning. Here we may cite Maximus Planudes and Augustinus Saturnius. Planudes⁴ said, "There are certain verbs that in no respect signify a subject or a person (which indeed we are also want to call impersonals), having the appearance or form of the third person, but belonging to none." Saturnius,⁵ in combating Priscian, gave the key to the ordinary objection in ancient days: "The gods destroy you, Priscian, with this doctrine of yours. In the first place you annihilate all impersonals with passive terminations; for those verbs to which one supplies such a nominative (*i. e.*, nominative of the activity implied) are manifestly of this sort. Then, afterward you attribute to all of them a passive meaning. But in truth this, your principle, if it be true, must also be understood

¹ Apollonius (Egger), p. 174.

⁴ Bachmann's *Anecdota Græca*, 2: 47.

² Miklosich, *Subjectlose Sätze*, p. 7.

⁵ *Sanctii Minerva*, p. 305.

³ Priscian, 2: 230, 2: 231.

throughout the whole conjugation of the verb. And so, whatever nominative is understood (or the nominative of a verb in the passive tense), this of course must be understood throughout all the remaining forms of its declension. Wherefore, when Tacitus says 'procursum est ab hoste,' here I beg you, Priscian, can that nominative of yours be rightly understood for verbs of the perfect tense?"

(c) In the Italian school we have the connecting link between the ancient and modern schools. Rinaldo Corso approached the subject principally from the objective, grammatical standpoint, but there was in him also a tendency to view the matter subjectively. A short quotation will give his view succinctly:¹ "That verb is impersonal with which there does not belong some person first, second, or third, but which, by means of the semblance of the third person, indicates some phenomenon in a general manner."

All these theories show clearly that great difficulty was experienced by ancient and mediæval logicians and grammarians in explaining impersonals. So long as they thought simply of the grammatical structure, the most natural interpretation was that the impersonal was really subjectless. As logicians, however, they were forced to search for a subject, and this led to constructions of propositions which to the ordinary, non-logical eye were fantastic and impossible. The tendency to pass from the proposition to the judgment, from the outer world to the inner, was necessitated by these contradictions, and was in direct agreement with the movement in the whole world of thought at the time. The first clear application of this to the impersonal was made by the Germans.

2. Having searched in vain for a subject in the grammatical expression, investigators began to turn their attention to the psychological structure. There was reason for this movement. As we have seen, thought had at first an objective outlook. But gradually the inner life differentiated itself from the outer expression, and a study of it for itself began to be made. This movement first made itself felt² in later Greek life and philosophy, but it was not until the Christian era that personality and the inner world came clearly to consciousness. Throughout the Christian ages the human soul was the great center of interest. However, it was not the structure of the soul in and of itself which was interesting. To the church

¹ In Venetia, 1562, 8, parte quarta, p. 365.

² See Windelband, and histories of philosophy generally.

it was an object of salvation. Hence, although Augustine made a close analysis of the inner life, this analysis proceeded upon the basis of the development of the soul through Divine Grace. The same may be said of the mystic movement. It was not until the time of the Nominalists and John of Salisbury that psychology became interesting in and of itself. Then, indeed, the mind which had served a long apprenticeship in the formulation, defense, and finally in the attack of the dogma of the schools, became aware in some measure that it had worth itself. When once the inner world came to be treated on a secular and scientific basis, the world of thought changed entirely. Theories of knowledge instead of theories of being, induction as opposed to deduction, science and psychology, began to force themselves to the front. In due time attention was turned from the formal expression of thought in the proposition to its warm, living nature in the judgment.

As regards the impersonal, the development of comparative philology not only aided but compelled the search for a subject in the processes of thought. At first there was some wavering and uncertainty, but in the end philologists were forced to admit that the subject as ordinarily sought did not exist at all.

Among modern philosophers Herbart¹ was one of the first to call attention to impersonal expressions and to recognize the lack of a subject. Vater,² the philologist, admitted that the subject is completely unknown. Sacy,³ being unable for logical reasons to conceive a predicate which had no subject, endeavored to meet the difficulty by supposing an ellipse. Miklosich, who did the first thorough-going work upon the impersonal, and who is an authority upon the linguistic side, criticized most destructively the objective value of the impersonal "It." He said:⁴ "The division of propositions into subject and predicate is not founded in speech, for there are judgments in which the subject is lacking. In the proposition 'Pluit' the subject is not only unexpressed, but it is not thought. In all such judgments an event is expressed without the operating subject being named. It is thus altogether incorrect when it is maintained that the subject of such a judgment is undetermined. Further, it is incorrect, also, when the

¹ *Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie*, pp. 104-6.

² *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Grammatik*, Halle (1805), p. 120.

³ *Grammaire Arabe*, 2d ed., 1831.

⁴ *Subjectlose Sätze*, pp. 2 ff.

ground of the peculiarity of such judgments is sought in the verb, and the verbs are divided into personal and impersonal. Finally, it is a mistake when the subject is sought in the pronoun 'Es,' which in several languages accompanies the so-called impersonals. In 'Es' no living subject lies. There is only the appearance or picture of it. When the subject is more determined we may say 'Zeus pluit,' but this is not given in the 'Es.' The impersonal 'Es' in German has no equivalent in the greater number of languages. . . . The subject is a contentless form word. . . . When the close connection between the subjectless proposition and the neuter gender is considered, one is led to the thought that those languages in which the neuter is lacking, because they know no difference in gender, should have no subjectless propositions at all. However, the Semitic and Romance languages contradict this. . . . Again, what are we to say when we perceive this usage in the Magyar, in which the difference of gender is unknown?"

Now, not only is this position maintained by those philologists who say that no subject can be found in the grammatical structure, but the contention is admitted by those who still maintain the traditional view of the judgment. To prove this point a quotation from Paul is all that is necessary:¹

"Our assertion that two members, at least, go to make up a sentence seems to be contradicted by the fact that we find sentences consisting of only a single word or of a group forming a unity. The contradiction is explained by the fact that in this case one member of the sentence is taken for granted, and finds no expression in language.

"In order to answer the question concerning the impersonal judgment properly, a strict division must be made between the grammatical form and the logical relation denoted thereby. If we regard the first merely, it cannot be doubted that sentences like 'Es rauscht,' 'Il gèle,' low Servian 'Vono se blyska' (it lightens), have a subject. But all efforts have proven fruitless to treat this 'Es,' 'Il,' 'Vono,' as a logical subject and to give it a definite interpretation. Again, in sentences like the Latin 'Pluit,' Greek 'ἔτα,' Sanscrit 'Varsati,' Lithuanian 'Sninga,' we may assume that the formal subject is not wanting. For such subject may be contained in the verbal termination under which a personal he, she, or it may be understood. It certainly may be said for the opposite view that in the languages in question the third person can stand also by the side of an unexpressed

¹ Principles of Language, pp. 116 ff.

subject (Jupiter pluit, δ Zeus $\vartheta\epsilon\iota$). But it is impossible to prove that the impersonal did not arise before this form of applying it. It seems most natural in this case to recognize a formal subject. It is with the personal ending just as it is with the dependent pronoun. The sentence as it is brought into the normal form has received a formal subject, which has nothing to do with the psychological. We must presuppose an older stage in which the simple verbal stem was set down—a stage which is actually seen in the Hungarian at the present day, where the third person singular has no suffix. And we can form a lively idea of this stage of language after the analogy of the sentences just discussed, which consist of a single (not verbal) word. These are really and truly, so far as linguistic expression goes, subjectless."

Thus both sides seem to be agreed that the endeavor to find a real subject in the grammatical structure must be abandoned altogether. Some investigators (as for example Miklosich and Marty), have been led by this to the view that the doctrine of the judgment must be reconstructed. The necessity for this view will be elaborated later. The majority of investigators, however, have turned to the psychological side to seek a subject. This type of theory maintains that in the impersonal form language is an inadequate representative of the real thought, and that a subject in some form must be sought in the thought process. This has given rise to a great variety of theories, and any discussion must depend upon a classification of views based upon the kind of subject sought. This, however, leads us to our second great division in the historical review.

II. As stated above, a great variety of theories here present themselves. In classifying these I have proceeded mainly on the lines laid down by Marty.¹ In this classification two great types (with many subdivisions to be noted later) appear :

1. The subject is universal or undetermined.
2. It is individual and more or less determined.

1. In the view of investigators of this type the subject to which the quality, activity, or event is referred is a vague, shadowy beyond. This may be the "Totality of experience," the "All comprehending Reality," the "Something or another, we know not what," or other subject in varying degrees of indefiniteness. These forms may be:

- (a) Indicated in the verbal stem. These have been treated above

¹ *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*, Bd. 8, pp. 56 ff.

under the classification of views according to grammatical structure. Priscian was the main representative of this view, but with him must also be classed Theoktist, Sanctius, and Vossius.

(b) Indicated in some other way.

a) The subject is something or another, we know not what. The defenders of this view admit that the grammatical subject is purely formal, but maintain that it is unthinkable that there should be predication without any subject of which the predication is made. This subject, however, is altogether undetermined and unknown. Every attempt to determine it has but revealed our ignorance of the true cause. Thus all grades of determination must be ruled out. Upon the basis of a mental necessity we recognize the presence of a subject which conditions the present appearance, but which itself is completely unknown and undetermined. Two eminent representatives of this point of view are Wundt and Erdmann. The former, speaking of impersonal expressions says :¹ "Judgments of the kind, 'It lightens,' 'It rains,' have been regarded as subjectless judgments. The name is evidently incorrect, for to that judgment the subject is by no means wanting, but is only left undetermined. The ignorance of the subject to which a predicate is attached is in general the ground of the undetermined judgment." The latter treats the impersonal as indicative of an undetermined cause :² "We must first cast out all judgments in which there is a reference to a determined logical subject. There remain as pure representatives the propositions referring to meteorological phenomena, *e. g.*, 'Es regnet,' 'Es blitzt.' In them the subject is presented as undetermined. In all such propositions a cause, be it ever so undetermined, is presented since an event without a substrat, a quality without a subject, is altogether unrepresentable."

β) It has been said that Wundt and those of the same opinion treat all attempts to determine the subject as illusory. But inasmuch as such attempts have been made they must be noted. Moreover, these attempts are manifest in the impersonal judgment itself. Erdmann plainly intimates that we must regard as impersonals, only those which refer to meteorological phenomena and are causal in their significance. This, however, is an arbitrary procedure.

¹ Logik, I, p. 155. Cf. M. Jovanovich, *Die Impersonalien*, p. 45.

² Logik, p. 304. Cf. Fr Kern, *Die deutsche Satzlehre*, 2. Kap.; Steinthal *Zeitschr. für V. Psy. u. Sprachwiss.*, Bd. 4, p. 235; *Grammatik, Logik und Psychologie*, pp. 92 ff.

The types of theory which fall under this head show many grades of determination. The subject may be simply the "Totality of experience," or the "All-comprehending Reality." But this experience, or reality, takes now one form and now another. The general characteristic of all the views is that the subject is vague and general, but the vagueness and generality are not always of the same degree. Here we may quote Uebérweg¹ as especially representative of this kind: "The subject can never be entirely lacking to a judgment and proposition. But, indeed, the determined subject presentation may fail, and the bare 'Something' takes its place. In 'Es (oder Etwas) ist ein Gott,' 'Es giebt ein Gott,' the undetermined presented Totality of Being, or an undetermined part of the same, becomes the subject, as in the propositions 'Es regnet' 'Es schneit.'"

2. In this second division the subject of the impersonal appears as individual and determined. Here we have several views. On the one hand we have the view represented by Bradley and Bosanquet, on the other the view of Sigwart.

Bradley and Bosanquet waver between regarding the subject as a vague beyond, to which reference is made, and the mere sense impression. To them the subject is individual in the sense of pertaining to sense experience, but nevertheless it transcends the sense impression. They thus form the connecting link between those to whom the subject is undetermined and general and those who conceive it as something so particular and determined as the mere sense impression. Bradley says:² "In 'Wolf' or 'Rain' the subject is the unspecified present environment, and that is qualified by the attribution of the ideal content 'Wolf' or 'Rain.' It is the *external* present that is here the subject. But in some moment of both outward squalor and inward wretchedness, where we turn to one another with the one word 'miserable,' the subject is here the whole given reality."

Sigwart is more definite in his view. For him the subject must not be confused with any internal object. It is found in the sense impression. That is, in the judgment, so-called, a sense impression of varying content is recognized by means of a familiar idea. But we shall let

¹System der Logik, 3. Aufl., pp. 162 ff. Cf. Lotze, Logic, Vol. 1, §§ 47-9; Prantl, Reform-Gedanken zur Logik, Phil.-Hist. Cl. Akad. zu München, p. 187; Schleiermacher, Dialektik, § 304.

²Logic, p. 56. Cf. Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, p. 109; also Essentials of Logic, p. 61 a.

him speak for himself:¹ "Real impersonals are those in which the thought of the thing to the predicate would apply is entirely wanting, in which we cannot even ask what the thing is. When we say in German 'mich hungert,' 'mich dürstet,' there is no room for the question, 'Was hungert mich?' any more than a substantive can be a subject to 'pudet' or 'poenitet.' When real impersonal propositions serve to express something which is accessible to immediate outer perception,—'Es donnert,' 'Es blitzt,'—then we start from a simple sense impression, to which neither perception itself nor memory supplies a subject. When, for instance, I see a rocket rise or hear a carriage rattle over the pavement, the action immediately added to the sound or sight which was given alone is naming—the unification of the present impression with a familiar idea. . . . The reference to a subject which is contained in the pronoun of modern languages is then an empty, customary form. These judgments, however, are without a subject only in the narrower sense that a subject thing is wanting. They are no exception to the general nature of the proposition which expresses a judgment. They contain the synthesis of a known general idea with a present phenomenon, and it is this phenomenon which is the subject and which is indicated by the personal ending with its original demonstrative significance."

Turning from these types of theory we come upon another form, essentially different :

3. From earliest times there has been opposition to the view that a subject could be found for the impersonal judgment. We have seen that when the search was confined to language, there was a feeling that a subject could be made out only by twisting the meaning of the proposition. The early critics showed pretty clearly that too many absurdities would be involved in the attempt to reduce the impersonal to the normal type. However, when comparative philology arose, the battle was finally decided in favor of those who maintained that the impersonal was subjectless. Our quotations from authorities on philological questions who represent opposite views on the logical problem have shown that the grammatical subject is empty and valueless.

Then came the position of those who sought a subject in the

¹ Logic, Vol. I, p. 62. Cf. Impersonalien; T. Ziegler, *Phil. Monatshefte*, Bd. —, pp. 42-7; Schuppe, *Zeitschr. für V. Psy. u. Sprachwiss.*, Bd. 2, pp. 244-97; R. F. Kaindl, *Wesen u. Bedeutung der Impersonalien*, *Phil. Monat.*, Bd. 28, pp. 278-305; J. Venn, *Mind*, Vol. XI, p. 413; Empirical Logic, p. 233.

psychical processes. The historical review has shown that the theories appearing from this point of view may be reduced to two great types. In one the subject is universal and undetermined; in the other it is individual and determined. Under these two great types may be subsumed views representing every grade of determination; so that we have a series running from the clearly determined and particular impression up to the universal and indeterminate "Totality of Being," the "All-comprehending Reality," or the completely unknown condition of the event.

These views would seem to exhaust the possibilities as regards the impersonal on the basis of the ordinary presupposition. For if a subject is to be sought, it must be found either in the outward linguistic expression or in the inner thought. If language fails, then our only resource is thought. But if it be sought in thought, the subject must either be particular and completely determined, universal and undetermined, or it must lie somewhere between these two limits.

Now we have seen that the search for a subject of whatever kind has resulted in nothing lasting. After all the criticism of the ages the problem seems to be as vexed as ever. This has been the reason why a new investigation on somewhat different lines seemed to be in order. The point of view represented by our criticism is that first indicated by Miklosich.¹ It is to the exposition of his theory that the present section is directed.

It seemed clear to him that every subject which had been brought forward was untrue, and yet it was equally clear that the admission that all judgment is twofold drove logically to a quest for a subject. He escaped the dilemma by attacking the presupposition which lay at the basis of all previous investigation. His criticism, however, simply indicated that the ordinary view of the judgment must be remodeled. The full justification of this criticism remains as something yet to be accomplished.

If we admit that the results of previous investigations have been sufficiently paradoxical to warrant a new investigation, several courses may be pursued: (*a*) We may refuse to admit that impersonal expressions are judgments, and maintain that search for either subject or predicate is futile. (*b*) We may deny that predication necessarily involves something of which predication is made. (*c*) We may ques-

¹ *Op. cit.* Cf. Marty, *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftl. Phil.*, Bd. 8, pp. 56 ff.; Bd. 18, pp. 320 ff.; Bd. 19, pp. 19 ff.

tion the validity of the presupposition and pass to a direct analysis of the experiences denominated impersonal.

The first assertion could be made only on the basis of a psychological analysis of the impersonal, and this has still to be made.

We must, therefore, turn to the second point. Can we say that the impersonal judgment presents us with a predicate for which no subject need be sought? Is predication the fundamental form of judgment? Trendelenburg¹ was of this opinion. However, this cannot be held consistently, for predication which is predication of *nothing* is a contradiction in terms. To predicate is to refer a quality; to refer a quality is to refer it to something. The statement that every predicate implies a subject is simply to say that predication is made. The judgment is analytical, and simply asserts an identity. The same may be said of quality and thing, of event and cause. Unless a quality is the quality of something, it is no quality at all. An event which has not been produced is self-contradictory. In all these cases the statement of the nature of the activity involved in the processes includes a reference to a correlate which cannot be separated from them. Erdmann² was correct when he said that a "quality without a substrat, an event without a cause, a predicate without a subject, was altogether unthinkable."

Thus, if we admit that the impersonal is a judgment and that all judgment is discursive or twofold, we must seek a subject, no matter how difficult the task may be.

This brings us to our third point. It still remains to us to question the assertion that all judgment is discursive. It may be that the full nature of judgment cannot be expressed in the discursive form.

The opinion that all judgment is twofold is very ancient. It goes back to the time of Aristotle and has behind it the authority of that great name, together with all the authority with which logical tradition and usage since then have invested it. To question such a generalization would seem to be exceedingly presumptuous. However, generalizations of whatever kind have their justification and sacredness only in the function which they serve. They are hypotheses or points of view, by means of which we organize different groups of experience. So long as they enable us to control experience they maintain themselves. But so soon as they fail in their function they must be set aside.

¹ Logische Untersuchungen, II, pp. 205-15.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. 19.

This may occur in two ways. It may be found that our first hypothesis was incorrect, and we, in that case, replace it by some other, or the hypothesis may explain a certain group of facts, but be found inadequate to others of the same order. In such a case the old hypothesis is subsumed under a fuller generalization. This would seem to be the case with the ordinary theory of the judgment. There can be no doubt, both that the discursive form of judgment organizes many of the facts of judgment, and that there are certain forms of judgment in which the theory has signally failed. It may turn out that the impersonal is no judgment at all. But however this may be, for purposes of investigation, we must, for the time being, set aside our view of the discursive as universal and examine the types for themselves. To do otherwise and to insist, as has been done, that all judgment must be discursive is to be utterly unscientific.

We have thus cleared the way for a new investigation of the impersonal; we must now endeavor to understand the impersonal on its own basis without reference to the criterion of the discursive judgment.

Before proceeding with our analysis, it is necessary to present types, not of the various theories of the impersonal, but types of the impersonal itself.

There has been a good deal of controversy whether certain expressions are really impersonal. The fullest and most careful collection which has been made so far is that of Miklosich; for this reason I have made liberal use of his material, but shall feel free to interpret it as facts may require.

Miklosich divides impersonal judgments into four kinds: (I), subjectless propositions with an active; (II), subjectless propositions with a reflexive verb; (III), subjectless propositions with a passive verb; (IV), subjectless propositions with a noun and a verb to be.

I. Under the general head of impersonals with active verbs may be distinguished:

1. Judgments which express the existence of an object; *e. g.*: "Es giebt einen Gott; Es ist ein Gott; Es war einmal ein König; Es hat grosse Bäume; Es hat an dem Orte schöne Pferde; Il y a deux ans que mon père est mort; Es hat keinen geringen Schrecken gesetzt; Es setzt wunderliche Reden ab; Es giebt etwas."

If we take expressions of the type of the first two, we see at once that they may mean one of two things. Either "Es giebt einen Gott" and "Es ist ein Gott" mean "Gott ist," or the expressions must be

taken absolutely and to express simply the recognition of that existence which has been termed God. As ordinarily used, there can be no doubt that the first interpretation is correct. In such a case the subject "Es" is purely formal, the true expression being "Gott ist." Here, then, we have to do with a disguised personal proposition.

But there is a sense in which the expression may be used absolutely. It may point to the experience which we might call "God intoxicated," in which the individual mind is so filled with the thought of God and feels it so deeply emotionally that there is no reference to existence, no discursive statement, but simply the inner, living recognition of experience itself, in the full, swelling expression "God." I suppose that in the prophetic state the feeling of unity with the Infinite (whether the experience be true or not) has been so intimate that the experience of the individual was at the same time (and immediately) the presence and life of God. In such experiences assertions are most certainly made, but they are assertions in which the parts are taken up into a life immediately felt and lived.

Of "Es war einmal ein König" the proper rendering most evidently is "ein König war einmal." The impersonal "Es" disappears altogether, showing that it was purely formal. Of "Es hat grosse Bäume" there may be two interpretations. We may suppose that the expression means that in some definite place (indicated perhaps by the pointing of the finger) great trees grow. In that case the "Es" is formal once more, for it serves merely as a symbol to indicate a subject known and definite, but which need not be further indicated, inasmuch as the center of interest is the great trees. This serves to indicate another interpretation. If our interest centers round the trees, the expression most properly becomes "great trees!" Here the exclamation points solely to the recognition of that experience which we call "great trees." The light, as it were, bursts upon us, and as the phenomena come into view, the expression of immediate recognition is forced from us.

"Es hat an dem Orte schöne Pferde ; Il y a deux ans que mon père est mort ; Es hat keinen geringen Schrecken gesetzt ; Es hat setzt wunderliche Reden ab," may be converted simply. Again the impersonal disappears, giving way to the perfectly definite subject.

"Es giebt Etwas" may be interpreted either as "Etwas giebt" or simply as "Etwas." If we follow the interpretation "Etwas giebt," the proposition becomes existential in nature, and the assertion is made

that something vague, indefinite, general, exists. But this interpretation seems to me somewhat forced, and fails to catch the shade of meaning which "Es giebt Etwas" endeavors to convey. The meaning is more exactly rendered by "Etwas" alone. The quick, half-startled exclamation denotes the recognition in an immediate way of some disturbing occurrence or object.

A review of these types of impersonals makes it clear that (a) the impersonal subject is purely formal, the true subject being brought out by simple conversion; (b) the "Es" has more than a symbolic value and indicates a vague, shadowy subject, of which some assertion is made. It indicates, as it were, the first beginnings of differentiation within a recognized content, the bare appearance of the discursive form. (c) In most cases the expression is more truly turned in the form "Gott," "Ein König," "Etwas." These indicate the immediate recognition or assertion of an experience, object, or event, in which no definite subject or predicate is discursively asserted.

2. The impersonal propositions which implicate phenomena of nature have been found to be, perhaps, the most interesting of all. But when we seek to analyze the experiences simply for themselves, they become very simple indeed. The remarks which have been made concerning the first class apply here very evidently.

If we take the expressions, "Es weht," "Es weht einen ungestümen Wind," the interpretation may be twofold. The "Es" may be purely symbolic and may conceal a subject perfectly well known. That this is so may be seen by converting the second sentence. It becomes "Ein ungestümer Wind weht." It is evident that we have had in mind all along the expression "Wind" as subject. But, again, "Es weht" may be and is more properly rendered by the expression "Weht." So also with "Es blitzt, donnert, friert," etc. Or again we may use the participle "Wehend," or "Blitzend." Sigwart himself¹ asserts that the impersonal expression may be turned as truly by the participles as by the ordinary form.

The English equivalents, "It rains," "It snows," "It thunders," present the same experience. We most truly express what we mean in these cases when we simply ejaculate "raining," "rain," "thundering," "lightning." For example, after being indoors for the greater part of the day, without noticing the weather, how often in stepping outside we suddenly exclaim "rain," "snow," "lightning," as the state of things

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 19.

presents itself to us. The one thing in our minds has been the simple recognition of the rain, the thunder, or the lightning. Or, again, when the fire-bell rings, often the only thing in our consciousness is the immediate, clear recognition of the situation expressed by the exclamation "Fire!"

To conclude, these expressions in their essential nature present us with the immediate recognition of a situation or an experience on its intellectual or on its active side. The simple content or activity recognized immediately and standing for itself fills our consciousness for the time being. It is present in the mind as an experience taken as a totality and recognized in and through itself.

(3) In previous examples the illustrations presented us with experiences recognized on their intellectual or on their active sides. The expressions implicating states of the soul or body give us illustrations of experiences recognized on the side of feeling. Such expressions are "Mich dürestet, hungert, schläfert." These may be rendered "Ich bin durstig, hungrig, schläfrig," so that the subject becomes "Ich," and the impersonal form disappears altogether. This is, of course, a possible and very common interpretation. But very frequently the feeling of thirst, hunger, sleep, is so prominent that it is the only thing in the mind at the time. In such cases the experience is most properly expressed in the terms "hungrig," "schläfrig," "dürstig." Here the mind is filled with an experience recognized in and through itself, and in which the state of feeling clearly predominates.

In such cases as these the utter lack of a subject in any form answering to the question "Was hungert mich?" etc., is apparent. As Sigwart says, "The moment we ask such a question it seems utterly absurd and inappropriate."

(4) When we turn to the judgments which express modifications of the senses, the truth of our assertion that the greater number of impersonals express an experience recognized immediately and as a totality is evident. In such expressions as "Es murmelt," "Es saust," there can be no doubt that the sense experience itself is most prominent in the mind. That the "Es" is purely formal and contentless may be easily seen, if we remember our state of consciousness when our fingers have been burnt. Someone seeing us start suddenly inquired for the reason of the start. The expression "burned" which has so often escaped us showed that the recognition of our state of feel-

ing was, from the intellectual side, the one thing in our minds. We may illustrate, again, by another customary expression: When we find that a metal or liquid which has appeared cool is very hot, we draw back the hand. The thought that flashes into our minds is, "Hot." We do not understand any "It," or "Something or another," nor even "The iron." Our one thought is given exactly in the expression "Hot." We should compare with this the childish expression "Burnie." I have noticed children murmur this expression to themselves when their eyes fell on something which at some time had been the occasion of a severe burning. To them the sense impression was not a sense impression as the psychologist understands it, but an immediately recognized content.

(5) The judgments which express a lack or a contradiction are not really impersonals. As noted in several cases already, the impersonal "Es" is formal and conceals the real subject. "Es mangelt an Geld," and "Ich muss schauen woran es fehlt," when converted, present subjects which are quite definite. The "Es" in "Es fehlt," which at first sight might seem to be indefinite, is not really so. The legitimate inference is that the subject of conversation requires an exposition which can be easily given. For example, what we really mean is, "Geld mangelt," etc.

(6) Those judgments which express mystery admit of easy interpretation. "Es spukt" is evidently similar to our expression "Spooks" and indicates the immediate interpretation of an experience as ghostly.

In "Es wandelt um," and "Es geht irre im Haus," the case is otherwise. In both there is a distinct reference to a "Something or another, we know not what," something undefined and vague is wandering about, or something is wrong in the house. Hence these expressions are quite different from the following:

(7) "Es geht mit dieser Sache wie mit der andern." "Es geht ihm um den Kopf." In the first the subject evidently is "Diese Sache," as may be seen by converting the proposition. In the second, "Es" refers to some definite thing (*e. g.*, a band) which encircles the head.

II. We turn now to the second great class of impersonals, viz., subjectless propositions with a reflexive verb.

In such expressions as "Es setzt hier schlecht," "Des Morgens geht sich's gut," "Il fait bon marcher le matin," "Es giebt sich leicht, wenn

man reich ist," a perfectly definite subject may be gained by converting the sentences. This point comes out very clearly when the English equivalents are given. We say, "That (the affair) has been poorly arranged," "Affairs go well in the morning," "The walking is good this morning," "Living is easy when one is rich." Such impersonals belong, therefore, to the class which are impersonal only in form, and in which the formal conceals the true subject.

III. The impersonals with a passive verb may, for the most part, be disposed of by conversion. If we take the expressions "Es wird gegangen, gelacht, geliebt," "Gott sei's gedankt," "Stets gegründet, stets geforscht und stets gegründet," by throwing them into the active form, the subject (be it the event, person, object, God) becomes at once definite and concrete.

IV. Turning to the last class of impersonals—subjectless propositions with a name and the verb to be—we find that they can be reduced with ease to the several forms already distinguished.

In such expressions as "Es ist kalt," "Es ist dunkel," the meaning may be expressed by "Der Abend, der Tag ist kalt, dunkel." In this case the subject is definite. Again, the meaning may be indicative of the recognition of the state of affairs as one steps outside. In such cases the expression should be "Kalt!" "Dunkel!"

Of the expressions "Es wird Abend, Morgen," "Es sommert, wintert," there may be several interpretations.

We may simply convert the sentence, as with the first expressions, and so gain a definite subject which, until conversion, had been concealed by the symbolic form. Or the "Es" may be taken to indicate something, we know not what, which is regarded as the cause of the phenomena; or finally the expressions may be taken absolutely, the meaning being conveyed in the immediate recognition of the event expressed by the exclamation "Abend!" "Sommert!"

Our review of the various forms of impersonals is thus complete. And unless our analysis has been incorrect, our result may be summed up in the following:

The formal subject may be interpreted in several ways:

1. It is purely formal and may be displaced by conversion.
2. The "Es," "It," or their equivalents, have more than a formal value. They indicate a vague, shadowy, undifferentiated subject.
3. In by far the greater number of cases the expressions show no discursive reference of a predicate to a subject. The true meaning

is indicated in the expression of an experience immediately recognized. This experience may represent any one of the three aspects of life, *i. e.*, it may be the recognition of an event, of a content, or of an affective experience.

Here we may remind ourselves of certain remarks made by Wundt and Sigwart in their consideration of the impersonal. Wundt says:¹ "All impersonal propositions are not undetermined judgments, but frequently a determined presentation conceals itself behind the apparent undetermined demonstrative pronoun. We do not say, 'It is John' in the same way in which we say, 'It rains.' The former is no longer undetermined." To this we shall add Sigwart's words² as explanatory of, the difference between the true and the apparent impersonal: "When I say, 'It is beginning,' 'There it goes,' 'It is over,' 'It is finished,' I always mean something definite, a series of events either expected or going on—a play, a piece of music, or a battle. And I assume that the person who hears me has his attention directed toward the same thing, so that any more accurate denotation is unnecessary. Here 'It' is a real pronoun, which is only chosen for the sake of brevity, because the usual denotation of what I mean is superfluous, or, perhaps owing to the nature of the thing meant, too circumstantial."

Hence this type of impersonals does not really belong to the class, and may be thrown out altogether. They are only apparently impersonal or subjectless.

This leaves us with two types for our consideration. On the one hand we have the type of judgment in which the subject is something general. As we have seen, this subject may be the mass of sense experiences, the universe in general, the all-comprehending Reality, or again something or another, we know not what. The attempt made by Jovanovich² to rule out this type of impersonal judgment is altogether arbitrary. He proceeds upon the basis that such judgments would be impossible to primitive men and are rare to the mind of the ordinary individual. Now it may be true that the logical formulation: "The universe in general," "The all-comprehending Reality," etc., may be very far indeed from most minds, but this is no objection applicable to the case in hand. The thought formulated in these general expressions need not be far from any man, primitive or reflect-

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 19; *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

² *Die Impersonalien*, pp. 21 ff.

ive. Indeed, the type of thought represented in these is vague, undifferentiated, and schematic. In them a predicate now defined for the first time is referred to a vague, shadowy whole which has been experienced and which now is just beginning to be broken up and distinguished. In fact, the reference of the experience to the all-comprehending Reality presupposes a simpler and earlier stage of thought than that represented either in the thought that the subject is a particular thing endowed with life, or cloud gods, or even such a god as Zeus. These belong to the stage in which experience has become so differentiated that particular things may be regarded as the causes of certain phenomena.

Again, the fact that so many types of theory have arisen which have in common only this that their subjects are general show that a gradual differentiation has taken place within this class of theories. This differentiation has proceeded from stage to stage, until finally the undifferentiated subject has become so definite as to take on the form of a particular thing to which reference might be made. This idea is further supported by the fact that no hard and fast line can be drawn between those impersonals to which we now add a purely formal subject and those in which the impersonal pronoun has a definite signification. This type of impersonal may be regarded as exhibiting the characteristics of the ordinary discursive judgment. And from this point of view the statement of Lotze that the impersonal has preserved to us practically the original and simplest form of the discursive judgment, seems to be correct.

Turning to the other great division of impersonals, we note that the experience centers itself in an immediately recognized whole. As distinguished from the first great division, there is no conscious reference to a subject, however indefinite. Here we must review the theory of Sigwart.

He, it will be remembered, maintains that in the true impersonal a present impression is recognized by means of an idea or memory image of a past experience. Now it cannot be denied that in the recognition of an experience an impression and a memory image are involved. Were it not so, there would be no such thing as recognition at all. But it is not necessary that the memory image and the impression be held apart and referred to one another. And this would seem to be the case with impersonals. For Sigwart the subject is found in the sense impression and the predicate in the memory image. Now

the assertion of their identity must be made consciously, if no exception to the ordinary discursive form is to be presented. But this is not the case. It is only upon reflection that we become aware that there is an impression and an idea. In the experience itself the two are so intimately associated that we are conscious only of the result of their combination, and not of the process leading to this combination. For example, let us take the case of "Fire." When the exclamation is suddenly made, we do not think of the impression, and of the memory image. What we have in mind is simply the familiar situation — an experience immediately recognized. Truly, an impression is present, and an idea by which the impression is recognized. But it is the recognition and the recognized content which interest us. No discursive reference is made. So in all the cases cited above: an experience (be it an intellectual content, an affection, or an activity) is recognized through an idea which is immediately assimilated to an impression of sense. The result of the assimilation alone appears in consciousness in an experience recognized in and through itself. In short, what we have in impersonals are cases of immediate recognition.

To proceed further. There are two forms of the impersonal. In one an experience is recognized in and through itself as a totality and in an immediate way; in the other the recognition is mediate and by means of the pasts. The former is non-discursive, while in the latter the discursive form appears. In both forms there is growth in definiteness. In the immediate form there is a passage from the merest scheme of a separable situation to a situation or experience so definite and complex that recognition can no longer be immediately made, and a predicate referred to this total experience appears.

So also with the discursive form. The subject passes from the barest indication of a subject through varying degrees of definiteness, until finally some definite and known subject takes the place of the subject impersonally indicated.

To our analysis we may now add one further argument in proof of our theory. This theory alone harmonizes the varying divergent views which have been held from earliest times.

Our historical review showed that the divergent theories could be reduced to two great types: (I), those which asserted that the subject must be individual and determined; (II), those which asserted with equal force that the subject must be universal and more or less undetermined. In the analysis given above these two fall together in the

forms of the impersonal as immediate and mediate. Where the subject is individual, it is immediately assimilated with the predicate or idea, *i. e.*, both subject and predicate really disappear; and where the discursive form really comes on the scene, the subject is undetermined and universal.

But not only does our view enable us to harmonize the views concerning the nature of the subject sought; it also shows us how we may place the presupposition which forced so many investigators to seek for a subject.

It was admitted as incontrovertible that a predicate could not be thought, apart from a subject. The two are correlative. In the discursive form of the impersonal we noted that certain qualities were abstracted and referred to a subject, whether it was completely unknown and indeterminate or only partly so. But in the immediate form of the impersonal no abstraction was made. There was no reference of parts to a whole: the qualitative experience was recognized and asserted as a totality. The meaning, instead of being gained piecemeal, was flashed into the mind at once. Now, inasmuch as the function of judgment is that of obtaining truth or meaning, there can be no doubt that the impersonal is truly a judgment. In fact, nobody has denied this. And yet, if this be so, it is impossible that the nature of the judgment can be summed up in the discursive form. As Miklosich asserted, our ideas of the judgment must be radically remodeled. The impersonal as immediate presents us with a form of judgment in which there is no subject and no predicate. The function of both is represented in an experience or situation of such a degree of definiteness as to have an individuality of its own, and in which a totality is recognized or asserted as real. The discursive judgment gives us meaning and recognizes reality, but through the mediation of the whole by its parts. Some predicate is emphasized for the time being, and is asserted as sustaining a definite relation to the subject-matter to which it referred. Judgment thus consists essentially in the recognition or appreciation of reality, whether in an immediate or in a mediate way. It is only in the mediate form in which the recognition of the whole takes place through the emphasis and development of the parts. In this connection several points must be noted:

1. It will be objected to our assertion of the originality of the impersonal judgment that in certain languages the impersonal symbol arises *after* such definite subjects as Zeus and Jupiter have been found

insufficient. It will be said that the progress of thought found such expressions unsatisfactory and unscientific, and that then the impersonal arose and was used to indicate a perfectly undetermined subject.

Now, it is true that if every impersonal arose after the determined judgment, the assertion that the impersonal form of judgment was original would most certainly be false. But several facts must be noted. The objection takes into account only those forms of judgment in which there is an impersonal formal symbol. All those forms of expression in which the judgment expresses an immediately recognized experience have been left out altogether. So that even if we were to admit that the objection held as regards those forms which possess the formal symbol, our contention would still hold good. But, again, how far this claim of the late origin of the formal "It" is true is a matter of grave dispute.¹ Finally, the difficulty arises mainly from the confusion of the impersonal symbol with the neuter pronoun. The impersonal expression may indicate many different degrees of determination, and to confine the meaning to the neuter "It" is an impossibility. The indefinite neuter may well have arisen late and have succeeded more definite and personal forms. But this has nothing to say against the originality of the true impersonal.

2. We may also be asked what relation the impersonal situation or experience bears to ordinary sensation. Both are immediate, and in James' terms might be spoken of as "acquaintance with," while the discursive form of judgment would fall under the category of "knowledge about." The chief difference (and it is an important one) is that of complexity. We commonly regard sensation as the simplest element in consciousness at which analysis can arrive. Or, again, it is the immediate result in consciousness of an affection of the organism. The impersonal judgment (in its immediate form) points to a differentiation within the "big, buzzing, blooming confusion" of early consciousness. Certain centers or kernels of experience have been formed, each of which immediately feels and recognizes its own totality. These centers have been differentiated sufficiently to be centers, but not sufficiently to give rise to a discursive division within themselves.

These remarks really conclude our analysis of the nature of impersonal judgments as we meet with them in adult consciousness. Before

¹ Cf. Miklosich, *Subjectlose Sätze*, pp. 13 ff.; Th. Benfey, *Göttingischen gelehrten Anzeigen*, 1865, pp. 1778-92; Paul, *Principles of Languages*, *loc. cit.*, p. 22.

proceeding to inquire into the significance of the impersonal it may be well to summarize our results so far :

I. The impersonal judgment has two forms: 1, the original, in which an experience, whether on the side of content, of affection, or of activity, is recognized as an immediate and more or less definite situation; 2, the secondary, in which this immediate experience splits up into subject and predicate, the predicate consisting of an event or experience abstracted from the total content and referred to a subject, either as unknown, as the totality of experience, or as some form of a general and undifferentiated subject.

II. In both the immediate and the discursive forms of this impersonal growth or differentiation takes place. The growth within the immediate form makes the experience so complex that it can no longer be recognized as a totality, but must attain unity through conscious analysis and synthesis—*i. e.*, through the conscious mediation of the whole, through the parts and the references of the parts in definite relations to the whole. In the discursive impersonal growth represents itself in a constant organization of the subject-matter, until finally the subject is reduced from the universe in general, the totality of being, to some definite thing, at which stage the impersonal displaces the particular judgment.

III. Our conception of the nature of judgment must be modified. The traditional view has been that all judgment is discursive, and consists solely in references. It is now evident that the discursive judgment is simply one phase of judgment. Although it may be true that there can be no predicate without a subject, it may also be true that there is a form of judgment where neither subject nor predicate appears.

This was given in the immediate impersonal judgment in which a definite experience or reality was recognized in and through a totality. The real nature of judgment would thus seem to be recognition or association, and this in two ways: (*a*) immediately, (*b*) mediately.

C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMPERSONAL JUDGMENT.

The impersonal judgment has significance in our present investigation in two ways, and in both of these its significance is very great.

They are: (I), its significance for logic; (II), its significance for psychology.

I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE IMPERSONAL FOR LOGIC

has already been dealt with to some extent. It has been seen that the traditional view of the judgment must be radically remodeled.

It has been agreed that judgment has had to do with the apprehension of meaning. But this apprehension, according to the old view, must be discursive. Reality in whatever form was recognized mediately through the reference of an idea beyond itself to some whole apprehended through it. The earlier view that in judgment two or more separate notions were united was displaced by the view that the judgment is unitary. In it a whole is grasped, but grasped through the mediation or adjustment of the parts. The parts are, as Bradley calls them, adjectives torn from the mere psychosis and used to indicate or symbolize the whole experience apprehended as meaning. In this discursive form it was imperative that every predicate should have a subject, for the very nature of the act of predication involved a subject of which predication was made. The impersonal, which was really a judgment (for in it reality was apprehended and meaning asserted), refused to conform to the general rule, for in most cases no subject could be found for it at all. Quite fictitious subjects were made for it, but on the whole it was treated as an anomaly. It never seemed to be considered that anomalies, exceptions, are often the most fruitful things for any investigation. A thorough-going consideration has shown that the impersonal truly asserts or apprehends meaning, and that its nature is not discursive. The meaning is recognized not through the reference of the parts to the whole. No symbol is abstracted and referred beyond itself. Parts and whole are apprehended in the same act and immediately. There is meaning, and we stand face to face with it. Reality truly is recognized and asserted, but not discursively, and symbolization is necessary. In the one case no abstraction of parts which are symbolic of the whole experience, is made. The experience is definite, but the thinking is concrete. In the other case abstraction from the reality is made, and a definite symbol is used, summarizing and organizing the whole body of experiences which it indicates. In this case thinking is abstract. The impersonal judgment is less definite and free when the experience asserted has meaning for itself alone, and its parts are so taken up into the total experience that, although some definiteness has been introduced, the measure according to which definition

has been made has not been clearly before the mind. It has this advantage, however, that it feels itself to be in most intimate relation to reality, is organically one with it, and, again, it is thoroughly concrete and for itself.

On the other hand, the discursive judgment which makes use of symbols is more free from individual experiences and can indicate or refer to a wider range. In the discursive judgment the idea of universality comes in. Not only is the discursive form of judgment freer than this impersonal, but it is also more definite. The symbol which is abstracted becomes a common measure of the various experiences to which it refers. And not only so, but, in becoming a measure, its own nature as a measure becomes more exact, and the relations in which it stands to the experiences which it indicates are more fully known. Finally, in the universal judgment the symbol is taken as perfectly exact, both in its own nature and in its reference; that is, the symbol has become fully abstracted and freed. We know exactly what it means, and to just what it refers. In short, we have exact measurement, through symbolization in which the nature of the measure is exactly known and can be used in perfectly identical ways, and also in which its range of reference is known, *i. e.*, its universality. In other words, the symbol in a discursive judgment aims finally to be used as a tool.

But while the judgment gains in exactness and universality by becoming abstract, it loses the appreciation of the wealth of individual experience which is present to the impersonal. We might compare the two in this way: The impersonal is individual, concrete, but inexact; the discursive judgment is exact and definite, but abstract, losing the warmth and color which belong to the indefinite.

This leads us to a further point in reference to the judgment. It would seem to be desired that we should get the full value of the concreteness and intimacy with reality which the impersonal asserts, and yet maintain the exactness of freedom which gives universality to the discursive judgment. Nor have we to go wanting. There is a stage of experience in which both sides are united, and in which in an immediate way we realize the full value of the individual side of our experience, while maintaining perfect exactness. In such cases the mind, indeed, works at its best. The stage I refer to is that of intuitive thought. We refer to it in other words as the expert judgment, and at other times realize it when we are "lost in our work," as we say. In all such cases

the mind is perfectly familiar with its material. Thought is most exact. The measures which in the discursive stage are used as symbols are still measures. The mind knows exactly what its measures are and the range of their application. Each problem is solved as it presents itself. No puzzling, no endeavor to refer is necessary. The whole is present as a whole, and with all its parts perfectly distinct and clear-cut. Complete immersion in the concrete detail and complete correctness concerning the nature and range of each measure are present. Perhaps the most characteristic examples of this experience are those of the artist (whether musician, poet, or what not) and the thinker when completely "lost" in his problem. When we say that the artist or thinker is "lost" in what he is doing, we do not mean that there is no consciousness of the material he has in hand. Quite otherwise. He is most certainly "lost" to the outside world, but he is most vividly conscious of that experience to which his mind is directed. To the musician there would be neither his own life nor music as such. It would rather become living music. Every part of the music is clear, definite, exact; but also every part is lived out and felt through and through. The expert shot may be said to make no discursive judgment. The bird rises in some particular direction; the estimation of distance, direction, and sighting are made practically instantaneously, or, as we say, altogether without thinking. Because he is so familiar with shooting and has made his symbols perfect tools, he can now act without hindrance and in such a way as to give a perfectly exact outcome.¹

Thus in judgment we would seem to have two forms and three

¹Of course it may be said that the expert type of activity is purely reflex and mechanical. It is a fact that actions performed consciously do become mechanical. But the reflex interpretation seems to be inadequate in the present case, and for the following reasons:

1. Actions which become reflex drop out of consciousness. It may perhaps be said that we get the value of the experience returned in terms of feeling. This is true. But the more deeply set in the organism the activity becomes, the less the conscious value appears.

Now, take the case of the musician. When he is lost in his music we cannot say that the value of the experience is merely felt, or that the process is purely mechanical, for it is, in fact, in such moments that he gets the full consciousness of every shade and turn of the technique of his performance and its outcome. Every turn of thought, every shade of emotion are present in consciousness and are immediately responded to in swift, clear thought and action. There is a difference between a player taken with paralysis who nevertheless goes on playing, and the football expert who notices every movement of his adversary and consciously meets the emergency. Outwardly

stages. The two forms are those of the immediate and mediate; the three stages those of the impersonal, the discursive, and the intuitive.

In the impersonal judgment an experience is immediately recognized, asserted, and felt as real. But although the experience is more or less definite, in that it is an experience, no exact measurement has as yet been introduced through the use of an exact symbol. But as the experience becomes more complex and definite within itself, and as greater demands are made, this symbol finally arises through the abstraction, isolation, and definition of some particular quality. In this stage of judgment the form becomes discursive. The whole cannot be measured immediately, but must be broken up into parts which are controlled by the various symbols. The symbols have reference beyond their own immediate existence. They indicate the particulars for which they stand, and build the meaning which they present into some consistent, definitely universal, but mediately recognized whole.

the two activities may appear the same, but inwardly there is all the difference of light and darkness between the two. In the one case there is simply a machine, and in the other a living personality.

2. We are forced to make a distinction between the thinker lost in his thought, yet to whom every shade and turn of the argument is clear, and the mystic who has driven every idea out of mind, and who has passed the subject-object stage. The thinker lives above the subject-object stage, the mystic below it. In the one case the mind is full of ideas, feelings, activities, the whole being is active and alive. In the other there is a dearth of ideas, a passivity of being, a mere existence.

3. The reflex interpretation of the intuitive experience fails to account both for the mental alertness of the musician, thinker, player, or sportsman, and for the rapid accommodation made necessary by the changing environment. The expert must "in a flash" size up each situation, and his expertness consists just in this. On the other hand, the paralyzed musician may play very delicately, but he must run along in the grooves of past experience. His behavior is like that of a locomotive which has lost its engineer. If the switches happen to be properly arranged, the locomotive will make wonderful excursions. But they must be arranged; itself can do nothing. So the activities of the musician may show themselves in many different forms, but they lack spontaneity and adjustment. This adjustment to individual experiences is characteristic of all stages of consciousness, but especially of the subject-object and the intuitive stages. There is this difference between the latter that in the subject-object stage we are trying to adjust ourselves, and in the intuitive stage we really succeed in the sense that we can perform the action immediately and without friction.

For these reasons it would seem that the intuitive stage is the unity of the subjective and objective phases of consciousness, and not their loss. And it would seem more reasonable. For if as action becomes perfected it disappears, and we never get the full value of the means in the end of the technique as technique, the process of experience would seem to be worthless and selfcontradictory.

Here judgment leaves out of account the individuality in existence of each particular, but through the symbol it becomes more and more exact, both in meaning and in reference, until it figures forth the universal in which the symbol has been wholly freed from the individuality of particular existences, presenting a meaning perfectly definite and identical with itself, and a reference which takes in the whole scope of its meaning and is, therefore, universal. Thus the discursive stands for perfect exactness and universality through complete symbolization or abstraction of certain qualities required for the particular references and indicated in the meaning, to the detriment of appreciation of the detail of individual existence. The impersonal fails in definiteness, and the discursive in appreciation. Both, however, are united in the intuition. When the discursive form has completed itself in the expert judgment which immediately and without reference recognizes the exact nature and range of meaning of their symbols, they pass over into the intuitive judgment. In this stage judgment realizes completely the individuality of each particular, and gets the full coloring which pertains to the particular. But at the same time the exactness and definiteness which are gained only through mediation of the symbolic stage are present.

Hence in the perfect form of the judgment the immediacy as well as the exactness and certainty of the earlier stages are represented. As immediate it has all the warmth, fullness, and glamor which pertain to any immediate experience, while as summing up the movement of the discursive stage it is inexact and universal.

To summarize this stage of our discussion: Judgment has to do essentially with the apprehension of meaning, the recognition of reality. In its earlier stages this apprehension takes the form of the immediate recognition of wholes which are definite enough to be used as centers of experience, but in which there is not yet a clear and exact definition of parts. The experience is apprehended as a totality. But this experience gradually becomes more definite within itself, until there is a necessity of adjusting the parts within one another in reference to the whole. Division arises. Qualities are abstracted from the whole and are used as symbols in terms of which the whole experience is measured. Through continued growth the symbols acquire definiteness, both as to their own meaning and as to their range of inference. The final stage is that in which the exact nature of the symbol is known, and its exact range of reference is also known. Where this is

the case, the identity of the symbol and the universality or completeness of its range are both known. This gives us the universal form of judgment. To most of us this identity and universality are purely formal, *i. e.*, we have learned to recognize that there is such a thing as identity and universality in judgment, but we practically never get within our own minds a complete and exact definition either of the nature of any of our symbols or of the exact range of their signification. In those few cases in which, in any department and in the minds of a few men, this identity and universality have been realized, with reference to any content, in these cases freedom in the manipulation and appreciation of the material is seen. But when this stage is reached—the stage of the expert judgment—there is no longer hesitancy in regard to the use of material, no retardation in inhibition. The content is fully appreciated in its individuality of coloring and existence, and is also grasped in the exactness, identity, universality, and perfect placing of the material. That is, once more the division into subject and object disappears, and we are in the presence of an immediately recognized reality. But it is immediacy which differs from the impersonal in that it is definite and universal, whereas the earlier experience was indefinite and individual. Thus the discursive judgment logically arises out of and returns into the immediate judgment. In the discursive stage the judgment must be twofold, but in both the impersonal and intuitive stages subject and predicate disappear. In the impersonal stage they have not yet been differentiated, while in the intuitive they disappear into an exact and immediately recognized whole.

II. SIGNIFICANCE FOR PSYCHOLOGY.

When once we have clearly in mind the fact that the discursive judgment arises out of the impersonal and tends to pass over into the intuitive or expert judgment, the significance of the impersonal in the construction of our theory of the development of consciousness becomes exceedingly important.

The impersonal judgment points to a state of consciousness in which all experience is recognized as a totality, and not by conscious mediation of the parts. The discursive judgment, in which the subject and predicate appear, and in which immediate recognition passes over into mediate recognition, indicates not a totality, but a whole. It grasps, or endeavors to grasp, through the definition and conscious reference of part to part. Consciousness is split up, a dualism appears

within it. The movement involves every phase of consciousness and is most fully expressed in the opposition of subject and object, of the known and the unknown. Finally, this opposition, which occupies us almost exclusively, is never consciously transcended, except in a few rare moments when we lose ourselves in our thought or actions. But in so doing we maintain clear and definite consciousness, while feeling ourselves absolutely one with our content or experience. Judged from an *a priori* standpoint this logical relation in the judgment would seem to point to the origin of the subject-object consciousness out of a state of consciousness identical with that given in the intellect. The impersonal judgment, on the other hand, tends to pass over and find its complete fulfillment in a state of consciousness where the meaning of subject and object is contained in a higher state of consciousness, but a stage which is clear, definite, expert, but not discursive.

The facts bearing on the origin of the subject-object consciousness should be found (*a*) in child psychology, (*b*) in race psychology. The evidence to be adduced for the development of self-consciousness into a higher phase should evidently be found in adult psychology, if anywhere. The first two points, when developed, should give us insight, not only into origin and function of the subject-object consciousness, but should also add insight to the arguments in favor of the theory of the impersonal advanced above.

1.¹ The child enters life apparently at a great disadvantage when compared with the young of animals. They soon learn to perform the movements and to engage in the activities peculiar to their kind. Children, on the other hand, have to serve a long apprenticeship before they can take part in the simplest distinctively human activities. But although this is so, the human animal is born into the heritage of a social and psychical environment which makes him rise far above all others. In short, the child life furnishes us with a magnificent example of growth from very small to very great and complex things.

In examining the stage of this growth, our attention must necessarily be directed chiefly to the development of the child's longer age. Here we get the expression of the child's thought in definite, concrete forms, and while reference to other phases of the child's activity will not be omitted, our point of view is necessitated from the fact that we

¹ In whole section *cf.*: Tracy, *Psychology of Childhood*; Preyer, *Development of the Intellect*; *idem*, *Development of the Will*; Perez, *First Three Years of Childhood*; Moore, *Mental Development of a Child*; Baldwin, *Mental Development*.

approach the whole subject in connection with one aspect of the judgment.

During the first six months of life the infant does not make any appreciable advance in language. He, as it were, is simply soaking in his environment. His speech consists simply of spontaneous babbling produced automatically by impulsive exercise of his vocal muscles. One of the most interesting things in connection with these early sounds is the wide range of their compass. All shades of emotion are expressed in forms incapable of repetition as the child grows older. Gradually out of this strange prattling mass definite sounds come to be distinguished; vowels usually precede consonants. These are repeated over and over again, stimulating themselves, until long before the sixth month syllables arise. At this stage reduplication plays a great part; for instance, "ma" becomes "mama." This shows that the activities involved in making these sounds tend to continue and stimulate themselves. This has been called the "circular form of reaction." Indicative of the above mentioned form of activity, vocal imitation arises. At first it is vague and shadowy, suggestive and impulsive, rather than clearly directed and controlled.

In the second six months imitation becomes all-absorbing, and consequently words begin to be used with meaning. The vague and shadowy form of imitation which characterized the first six months gives way to a more definite form. Simple imitation tends to pass over into the persistent form. With this growth in imitation comes an increased power of attention. In early life the child's attention is almost altogether at the mercy of external circumstances. But through imitation control is developed, and the child is enabled to continue doing something suggested.

At this time, also, the child commences to recognize members of the household by name and to recognize parts of his own body. This shows us that a period of quite extended duration is required before there is developed out of the undifferentiated whole of early experience the consciousness of definite experiences and of definite objects. This statement, which is true of all sides of the child's life, is beautifully illustrated from the side of language. Taine, in speaking of the acquisition of language by his own child and in dealing with this period, says:¹ "As yet she attaches no meaning to any word she utters, but there are two or three words to which she attaches meaning when

¹*Revue Philosophique*, No. 1; *Mind*, Vol. II, p. 252.

she hears them. She sees her grandfather every day, and a chalk portrait of him, much smaller than life, but a very good likeness, has often been shown her, from about two months. When asked 'Where is grandfather?' she turned to this portrait and laughed. Before the portrait of her grandmother, not so good a likeness, she made no such gesture and gave no sign of intelligence. From eleven months, when asked 'Where is inamma?' she turned toward her mother, and she did the same thing for her father." Here we have intelligence and recognition. The "big, buzzing, blooming confusion" of early life has gradually passed into the recognition of experiences separated out from the undifferentiated totality and forming more or less definite centers. But we must not suppose that in these experiences we have anything more than situations immediately recognized and grasped in their totality. Taine continues: "I should not venture to say that these three actions surpass the intelligence of animals. A little dog understands as well when it hears the word 'sugar;' it comes from the end of the garden to get a bit. There is nothing more in this than association: for the dog, between a sound and some sensation of taste; for the child, between a sound and the form of an individual face perceived. *The object denoted by the sound has not yet a general character.*¹ However, I believe a step was made at twelve months. Here is a fact decisive in my opinion. This winter she was carried every day to her grandmother who showed her a painted copy of a picture by Luini, of the infant Jesus, naked, saying at the same time, 'There is bébé.' A week ago, in another room, when she was asked 'Where is bébé?' meaning herself, she turned at once to the pictures and engravings that happened to be there. Bébé has then a general signification for her, viz.: what ever she thinks is common to all pictures and engravings of figures and landscapes—that is to say, if I am not mistaken, something *variegated in a shining frame. In fact, it is clear that the objects painted or drawn in a frame are as Greek to her. On the other hand, the bright square enclosing any representation must have struck her.*¹ This is her first general word. The meaning she gives it is not what we give it, but it is only the better fitted for showing the original work of infant intelligence. For if we supply the word we did not supply the meaning: the general character which we wish to make the child catch is not that which she has chosen. She has caught another suited to her mental state, for which we have no precise word."

¹ Italics mine.

This quotation will make clear to us that in this recognition by the child we have no reference at all to definite objects. Taine himself admits this. All that existed for the child's mind was simply a definite image, which she recognized, and which we call something "variegated and in a shining frame." But if this be so, there can be no meaning in speaking of the child's image at this stage as a general idea. We cannot truly speak of an abstraction, for as yet the only definite thing is the recognized experience. In it there is no reference of an idea beyond itself, no separation between existence and symbol. What we are inclined to call the symbol can be no symbol, for it is the only reality definitely recognized by the child. In short, to speak at this stage of a general image in any sense in which it can be used as a symbol is incorrect. It is a case of the psychologists' fallacy. To the child there is neither a particular nor an idea. *We* distinguish different things, and recognize that we abstract certain qualities which are used as symbols or signs of these existences. But, as we have seen, there is no distinction of objects to the child at this stage. Hence, there can be no abstraction of qualities in any sense in which they indicate some object. In short, the vague and schematic image is all the object there is, so that it cannot stand for anything else. We do put it otherwise to the child, and there is one stimulus and one reaction in the experiences which we adults regard as different.

The above interpretation throws great light on the child's development between the twelfth and eighteenth months. As we should expect, there is a marked progress in the understanding of words, and in their intelligent application. In longer words children reproduce the important part alone, and they now begin to express themselves in sentence words. But perhaps the most interesting feature of all is that the childish concept endeavors to make itself exact and definite.

On this point Tracy says:¹ "But perhaps the the most interesting thing of all this time is the gradual 'clearing-up' of the childish concepts, as indicated by the steady circumspection of the application of names. Even yet, however, names are applied much too widely; much more experience is necessary before they acquire in the young mind a clear and definite connotation. It is interesting, also, to note how the principle of association enters as a factor in the determination of the application of the name. When the child calls the moon a lamp, or applies his word 'bô' (ball) to oranges, bubbles, and other

¹ Psychology of Childhood, p. 73.

round objects; calls everything 'bow-wow' which bears any sort of resemblance to a dog (including bronze dogs on the staircase, and the goat in the yard); applies his word 'papa' and 'mamma' to all men and all women, respectively; makes his word 'cutie' do duty, not only for 'knife,' but also for 'scissors,' 'shears,' 'sickle,' etc; says 'bä' (bath) on seeing a crust dipped in tea; applies 'ati' (asses) to 'chair,' 'footstool,' 'bench,' 'sitting down,' 'sit down,' etc.; it is evident *that one great striking resemblance has overshadowed all differences in the object.*¹

This whole paragraph illustrates the point which we made above in regard to the "concept." The childish "concepts" are no concepts at all. Differences exist in the objects only for us. Hence, what we take to be the reference of a vague recognition of similarities in objects to different objects, is not all indicative of the true state of things in the child's mind. What he really has in mind is an indefinite image. Given stimulations which have any similarity at all, as we conceive them, the child interprets in one way. That is, to the child there is but one stimulus, one reaction, one object, viz., an experience sufficiently differentiated to be grasped as a totality, and to be recognized in and through itself. The child has not yet got to a stage where its experience, or life, is sufficiently differentiated to admit of a conscious recognition and reference of parts in a whole. This stage, however, is reached in some children just before the end of this period. Short sentences are used, in which only the prominent ideas appear. The full meaning of the stage is seen in the period ranging from the eighteenth to the twenty-fourth month. Preyer records at this period, "the greatest progress, however, is indicated by the combination of two words into a sentence." The two words really used are a noun and a verb. Here we see that the immediately recognized situation which was formed out of the chaotic totality of early conscious experience has itself become so differentiated that unity in differences must be consciously recognized within the former totality. A dualism has appeared, which is represented on the intellectual side in the discursive judgment through the development of the nominal and verbal tendencies.

But this is not all. Simple imitation, which was expressed in the circular reaction of early life, gradually passed over into persistent imitation. This, when once differentiated, developed rapidly, showing itself in the more complete apprehension of meaning, and in the development of control. In this period an independence of activity quite

¹Italics mine.

strong and marked showed itself. The ambition of the child was aroused, and he desired to go his own way without hindrance. It is evident from this that we have here to do with the dawn of self-consciousness in the child. That is, we begin to see traces of the recognition of self as self at the time when the impersonal form of expression begins to pass over into the discursive judgment.

Thus the analysis of early child life directly confirms the account of the impersonal judgment given above, with the added fact that the passage from the impersonal to the discursive judgment is indicative of the development of self-consciousness in the child.

Now, if these things be so, some trace of this process should also be found in the differentiation of the subject-object consciousness in the race. If we turn our thought to the development of language, we should expect to find the different parts of speech disappearing, first, into a twofold movement expressive of the nominal and verbal tendencies, and, secondly, into a stage in which meaning is represented by a form of thought corresponding to the impersonal. At the point where this impersonal stage of thought passes over into the discursive judgment we should expect to find the passage from the animal consciousness into the human.

2. In entering upon this division of our subject, a distinction must be made between the science of language and the science of thought.

The Science of Language observes and systematizes the various facts and forms of language, and seeks to formulate the laws by which it has been and is governed in its transformations. It seeks to understand the vehicle of thought, not as a vehicle, but in itself.

The Science of Thought endeavors to investigate the psychological aspect of the subject-matter presented by the Science of Language. Language as a vehicle is made to contribute to the understanding of the thought of which it is the vehicle.

Now, in this procedure it would seem that the Science of Thought is dependent upon the Science of Language, and must wait until the latter has handed in its results. This is true to a very great extent. A Science of Thought cannot be manufactured or spun out of our heads, and inasmuch as it endeavors to construct the thought movement, it must await the elucidation of the forms in which past thought has expressed itself. But although the psychologist may depend upon the comparative philologist for material, it is as material that he receives it, and he may feel himself free to interpret the facts as an understand-

ing of them from the psychological standpoint may demand. Just as the philologist, on the historical side, demands that he should be free from all interference from psychologists while investigating the facts and forms of language, so just as truly may the psychologist demand that the philologist should give simply the results of his labor as material and spare the advice which is so often given.

As there has been evolution in the physical and organic worlds, so there has been evolution in the conscious world. Of this the development of language¹ is one of the most evident proofs. As civilization has advanced, language has been continually refined, until the efficient and graceful instrument which we find in more advanced nations in both past and present has been produced.

It may further be noticed that the earliest stage of language which the philologist can reach is still immeasurably far removed in time from primitive human speech. But although the barrier of time can never be overcome and we can never present the primitive language, still, from the nature of the development within language itself, we can form a quite trustworthy opinion of what its psychological nature must have been. This, however, is to presuppose the result of our analysis, to which we must now proceed.

In the unity of the discursive judgment (recognized by all and considered by most to be the only true form of judgment) two movements are usually distinguished—that of the subject and that of the predicate. These united in the copula represent the content of the unified thought. In these two movements certain distinctions are now made: nouns, adjectives from nouns, adverbs, etc. But while these various distinctions are recognized by philologists, it is emphasized that they were not always as clearly worked off as they now are. As we go backward in the history of language, the differences which distinguish the nominal and verbal movements begin to disappear. Not only do the differences in the inflectional forms disappear, but also the two movements themselves become confused. In certain cases nouns are derived from verbs and verbs from nouns. For this reason endeavors have been made to reduce nouns to verbs, and *vice versa*. But the general consensus of opinion now seems to

¹ Cf. Paul, *Principles of Language*; Brugmann, *Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages*, Morphology, Pt. I, p. 2; Max Müller, *Science of Language and Science of Thought*; Sayce, *Introduction to the Science of Language*; Delbrück, *Introduction to the Study of Language*; Giles, *Comparative Philology*.

be that so far language does not admit of this reduction. As far back as we can go the two movements remain, the one as distinct as the other. But contained in both nominal and verbal stems there has been a unity, which seems to indicate that they arose out of one original form. Concerning this point a great deal of controversy has arisen, and the end is not yet. Those who follow the Science of Language most closely, and to whom philology is purely formal and historical, insist that there is no reason to suppose that any root form which we have is original and indivisible; *e. g.*, Brugmann says:¹ "Strictly speaking we are never sure in the case of a suffix which has come down to us from the Indo-Germanic parent language, whether it ever existed as an independent word, exactly in the same shape as we extract it from the body of the word, or whether it originally consisted of elements which passed into this shape by a regular phonetic change. It is theoretically correct when we say that the root of a word is found after we have removed all formative syllables from it. But in the first place, we do not know what shape Indo-Germanic words had toward the end of the root period, and this applies especially to the fact that we are unable to say whether the language at this stage possessed only monosyllabic, or only polysyllabic, or words of both categories. Secondly, the analysis of elements which were directly annexed to the ends of roots is of a most doubtful nature. And, lastly, we are unable to determine what phonetic changes inflexional compounds had undergone from the beginning up to the dissolution of the primitive community. Hence, it must not be supposed that the roots which we in ordinary practice, abstract from words are at all to be relied upon, as representing the word forms of the root period. We are utterly unable to understand, *e. g.*, whether the complex *a. n. ∂.* represents a unitary word of the root period, or whether it is to be resolved into *a. n. ∂.*, that is, whether *∂* was a suffix and thus originally an independent element. Such being the state of things, we shall retain the terms root and suffix in this work for such part of the word as 'seq' and 'e,' 'tai,' 'sequetai.' . . .

"We do not, however, assert that the elements to which we give these names ever existed as independent words. We merely indicate by means of hyphens (-) what was probably felt at any particular period as the nucleus (so to speak) of the whole system of word

¹ Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic Languages, Morphology, Pt. I, pp. 13-18.

forms — 'seq' and "e," what was regarded as the formative element."

It is evident from this that the root has been taken in a purely formal way and from the standpoint of the Science of Language, as dealing simply with the facts and laws of linguistic transformation. It is just what would be expected. There is no reason to suppose that the word forms which we are able to obtain from any known language are primitive and indivisible. It is the same here as in child language. The external forms may be divided and subdivided, until the external, formal root or generalized concept as expressed in language has disappeared into the crudest articulations. From the historical and formal standpoint it may be said that the death blow has been given to any system which would abstract any root and say that it was the primitive form.

But the matter ends here only from the purely formal and historical standpoint. The logical consideration of the formation of roots still remains, and there seems to be no doubt, even among philologists who emphasize the historical side, that a root period existed. What this root period stood for, and what its general nature and formation were, is a further and legitimate question. And, further, it is not to be supposed that it is our purpose to indicate what particular meaning primitive roots had. Rather, it must be our endeavor to find out whether it is more natural to suppose that the nominal and verbal stems are ultimate, and, therefore, the root purely ideal, or whether the root was the real unity out of which the nominal and verbal stems differentiated.

Even in Brugmann we find the conception that the root is a nucleus or kernel around which the thought in the nominal and verbal stem centers. Further, it is now agreed that as far back as we can go the two forms of stem begin to shade into one another. Now, if we carry this thought back far enough, we see that the nominal and verbal stems must gradually become less clearly differentiated from one another, until finally they disappear into an experience in which meaning is grasped in what we have called a situation or totality, as represented in the impersonal judgment. How many of these roots there were, and what their particular meaning was, we cannot say. Nor need we concern ourselves about it. All that interests us is the function which this root stage played in language.

Here we may make a quotation from Delbrück,¹ which deals directly

¹ Introduction to the Study of Languages, pp. 77 ff.

with the idea of roots. He says: "Bopp derived from the grammatical tradition of his time the principle that the whole word material of a language must be traced back to roots. However, he did not express any opinion whether or not those so-called roots shall be regarded as real linguistic structures or only as abstractions of the grammarians. But Pott says: 'Roots are the chieftains of a word family. They are the unity, the pyramidal points, in which all members of such a family terminate. Only composites can, like married pairs, belong to two families. Roots are, furthermore, only imagined, as mere abstraction; in reality there can be no roots in language. Whatever may wear the outward appearance of a pure root is a word or a word form, not a root; for a root is an abstraction of all word classes and their differences—a possessing of them without refraction. A root is not like a letter or a syllable simply. It is also the unity of meaning of words and forms which genetically belong together, and at their creation were present as prototypes in the soul of the language maker. When not wholly obscured, it is felt more or less plainly by every speaker in connection with the language which he uses.' Add to this: 'Roots are ever mere ideal abstractions necessary to the grammarian in his calling, which he must nevertheless extract from language in strict conformity with the given reality.' Pott accordingly denies that roots can have existed before the inflectional form. If now it must be asserted that declension arises in the Sanskritic languages by the affixion of inflectional suffixes to the fundamental forms of the noun and conjugation through the affixion of others to the root or stem, this must not be understood to imply that the fundamental form and the root are something existing independently and out of connection in language, or something, as it were, present in language before inflection. What is really meant is only that the fundamental form is contained in all the cases of nouns, and the root in all verbal forms, as that which is still undifferentiated, as that which is common to them, which grammatical analysis alone for scientific ends tries to free from all the differentiated characteristics united with them, and to display in all its simplicity. *This definition of Pott is correct in so far as it rightly defines the position a root occupies within a finished inflectional language. But it is one-sided, inasmuch as it does not state how the roots arrived at this function. To this question only one answer is possible from the standpoint of Bopp's hypothesis. If the prototypes of the now existing inflectional forms really arose by means of composition, especially the proto-*

*types of forms of the finite verb, by composition of a verbal with a pronominal root, then the root must have existed before the word existed. Roots are contained in words because they existed before them, and were merged in them. They are the words of the pre-inflectional period, and vanish with the development of inflection. Therefore, from the standpoint of the perfected inflectional speech, what was once a word appears only as an ideal center of meaning. This wholly intelligible and consistent view of the root may be said to be universally accepted at the present day."*¹

Pott was forced to believe that the root was really a center of meaning. But this center he believed to be purely ideal. That is, although the roots were present in the minds of primitive men and were copied in language, there was nothing corresponding to them antecedent to the early stems and expressed in language. That is, the roots were to Pott virtually concepts innate in the primitive minds and regulative of early language.² If this were so, they must have been empty and formal. That is, all difference would fall on the side of the linguistic stem and the unity on the side of the concepts. But if the concepts were empty, there could be no distinction within them. Consequently, they could not be distinguished one from another; nor could they be applied to particular thoughts, for there would be no reason within them why they should be applied to one rather than to another. That is, Pott abstracts the unity of movement present in early thought and sets it over against the particular differences which have been differentiated. A true view is to note that the unity present in the early thought gradually becomes less and less clear, until we are brought to a stage in which a meaning existed, but not a meaning indicative of different objects consciously presented. This meaning existed in totalities of experience immediately recognized. And in this sense we see that, as Delbrück says, roots may be consistently and intelligently maintained.

Thus the study of language brings us to the same result as the study of the child. The discursive movement given in self-conscious thought and language disappears into a form of thought in which experiences identical with those which are expressed in the impersonal judgment appear. And not only so, but we have seen that the passage from the impersonal to the discursive form of thought occurs in the earliest stages of distinctively human life. That is, as far back as we can trace a distinctively human experience, nominal and verbal stems

¹ Italics mine.

² Cf. Max Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

are found. But these point on to an earlier and more primitive stage of root forms or impersonal thought. Once more we find the passage from the impersonal to the discursive form of thought co-eval with a passage from a merely conscious stage to a stage in which the opposition between subject and object begins to appear. Impersonal judgments, as it were, begin to appear just below the threshold of what we ordinarily term self-consciousness, and on the threshold itself. In short, they seem to form the connecting link in thought between animal and human intelligence, as well as indicating the form of experience in which the differentiation as a whole is made.

This conclusion to which we have been led through the investigation of the impersonal judgment should be compared with certain results reached by Romanes from the standpoint of comparative psychology. From a close study of animal life he was led to believe that a definite type of thought was present in the life of the higher animals. Through this "receptual" thought, as he designated it, the life of these animals was distinguished, on the one hand, from mere sense-experience, and, on the other hand, from the self-conscious life of man.

When we inquire into the nature of this receptive process, we find that it corresponds exactly to what we have shown to be the true nature of the impersonal judgment. It distinguishes itself from sense-experience in that it is composite, taking up into itself the results of past experience. It is distinguished from distinctively human experience in that it is immediate merely. Differences are felt rather than abstracted. This we have found to be characteristic of the impersonal judgment, the childish "concept," and the racial root. The agreement in outcome thus materially strengthens each position, and forces us to believe more strongly than ever that in the impersonal we have the original form of judgment and the connecting link between the conscious and the self-conscious stages of experience.²

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

There remains the task of a brief recapitulation of the general movement and outcome of our investigation.

Previous investigations of the impersonal judgment have been unsatisfactory because of a general presupposition in regard to the

² A criticism of Romanes' position at once suggests itself. To him the order of succession in thought is that of percept, recept, concept. For reasons which will be evident from the whole standpoint of the essay, percept and concept arise together,

nature of judgment. According to the traditional view, all judgment must be discursive and must contain a subject and a predicate. The traditionalists are right in maintaining that we cannot separate the subject from the predicate, for it is self-contradictory to assert that we may have predication of nothing. But they are untrue to scientific procedure when they maintain that all judgments must conform to the discursive type. A form of judgment in which neither subject nor predicate appears would obviate entirely the difficulty raised in regard to predication. It has been felt from earliest days both that impersonals are real judgments, and that they do not conform to the ordinary type. The search for a subject has shown the fruitlessness of the attempt, for either no subject is found or we must warp the natural meaning of the proposition.

When we lay aside all presuppositions and examine the impersonal form of expression on its own basis, we reach the following result: In its essential form the impersonal is the immediate recognition and assertion of an experience, in which the whole is recognized in its totality and not through its parts. But this totality gradually differentiates, until recognition of the whole can take place only through the parts. Here the discursive judgment appears. Now, inasmuch as we cannot assert at just what moment the immediate form of the impersonal passes into the discursive judgment, a mediate form appears, in which the symbolic* subject indicates a content, however vague it may be. Here, again, growth changes the experience, until a definite, particular subject appears, and we have the full-fledged discursive judgment.

This point of view enables us to harmonize the various divergent types of theory. We can account for all the facts which they present without doing damage to any. We are enabled to see how those who asserted that the experience was individual and concrete had ground for their assertion, while at the same time admitting that those who maintained that the experience pointed to something general and universal had equal right to their opinion. Also, we are enabled to remove contradictions from both views by finding either that both subject and predicate are lacking, or else that both appear in a vague, schematic way.

As Kant says, percepts without concepts are blind, and concepts without percepts are empty. Each is meaningless when taken alone. Percepts present us with the discriminative side of the discursive process, while concepts give us the side of unity. We cannot have the one without the other.

But if this be so, our analysis is of great importance both for logic and psychology.

The most significant point as regards logic is that the ordinary view of the nature of judgment must be radically remodeled. The discursive form does not exhaust judgment. The discursive judgment arises out of an immediate concrete judgment and passes into an immediate concrete judgment. When the impersonal experience has differentiated to such an extent that, instead of a buzzing confusion, more or less definite centers of experience appear, these are recognized and asserted in their totality. When these in turn have become so full of content that friction arises within them, the parts are abstracted, and the whole is mediated through them. The parts become symbolic of the whole. But, again, when differentiation has proceeded so far that the symbols may be used with exactness as regards their own nature and the extent of their reference, friction disappears, and we have once more an immediate stage in judgment. This, however, distinguishes itself from the impersonal judgment in that the whole is recognized through the parts, and both whole and parts are exact and definite.¹

¹ Further implications of the impersonal are apparent.

Much has been said concerning the relation of impersonal and existential judgments. From the standpoint of our analysis all judgment is existential. The impersonal takes its "totalities" for existences, the discursive judgment endeavors to make apparent the nature of the existence assumed in the impersonal; while in the intuitive stage there is a definite assurance that the experience recognized is real. The different forms of judgment are thus stages in our recognition and exposition of existence.

But this, again, involves the nature of belief and its relations to judgment.

In all judgment there is an element of belief, whether in the forms of primitive credulity, of belief struggling through doubt, or of belief so thoroughly assured that its "what" and "why" are ever ready.

Again, judgment mediates and grounds belief, while belief connects all judgment with reality. The criterion for the truth of judgment must be the criterion for the worth of belief. To say that all judgment is existential is, therefore, but to say that thought as such believes that it has to do with reality.

Such a view would lead us to believe that since all judgment is recognition or assertion of reality, that the criterion for the truth of judgment, and the worth of belief, cannot lie in judgment or in belief. Judgment and belief both land us in the hypothetical stage. How do we pass to verification? If the scientific position be true, all verification comes through action—the testing of our hypotheses by crucial experiments. Judgment and belief simply prepare us for action. In this preparation judgment provides the mediation; belief, the motive. Through thought we become convinced or believe that reality is such as we take it to be, and that, if we act according to our belief, we shall gain certain experiences defined and expected

Turning to psychology, our outcome has been that the impersonal judgment forms the connecting link between conscious and self-conscious experience in the adult, the child, and the race.

Conscious experience begins in vague indefiniteness, and it is long before any definite image or center is recognized. But images or centers as totalities do finally appear. These become more definite and overlap in the unity of the life mediation; then the mind is forced to the recognition of wholes through their parts. This recognition of wholes brings to clear consciousness the nature of the activity as a unity amid differences, as a process making use of means and ends. In short, consciousness now becomes self-consciousness. All further development is that of the personality which has been produced. It is a process working by means and through ends. When the recognition of the means for any end has become perfect, and we can immediately control them, the richest form of self-consciousness in what we have called expert action appears. Whole and parts, end and means, subject and object, are one definite, unified existence. Such states may, perhaps, be rare, but they are seen in the musician lost in his music, in that perfection of thought in which we are lost to all about us, in the expert player who in the midst of the game must constantly adjust himself to new conditions.

in thought and belief. If we do get them, then, we take it, our thought is true, and our belief is assured. But this means that we have come back to experiencing, through experience defined, directed, and tested. Of this direct experiencing both judgment and belief are phases.

Now the question comes, What is the relation of the Real to the fact of experiencing? Is Reality Experiencing? This opens up a fundamental metaphysical problem. The aspects of the problem twine and intertwine, and seem to find their origin and outcome in the impersonal and intuitive judgments.

This point of view suggests a further problem, viz., the development of the self from mere experiencing through the impersonal and subject-object stages to the intuitive stage of which we are conscious at times.

Our view of the judgment would suggest the reduction of thought, action, and impulse to one developing life movement. The inner nature of this movement would be given in an analysis of the different stages, while the process of growth would be best seen by a section of the various layers.

This, however, is a further problem.

